Sky Grab: China's ambitious plans to dominate the orbital internet race

Starlink has already transformed connectivity, with thousands of satellites in orbit providing internet access almost anywhere on Earth. Ukraine has depended on it to keep communications alive during war, and remote villages from Alaska to Africa are online. For years, this quiet revolution has carried an American imprint.

China wants to redraw that map. Guowang plans to orbit some 13,000 satellites, with another project — Qianfan — aiming for 15,000 more. If both succeed, they will dwarf existing networks. But these are not just for the internet. Guowang satellites are far heavier than Starlink’s, rumoured to carry synthetic aperture radars, optical sensors, and inter-satellite lasers. This is a dual-use network, civil in name but military-capable from inception.

Beijing has studied Starlink’s wartime utility closely. The lesson was not just about replicating a business model but also about designing a system that doubles as national infrastructure and strategic weapon.

Starlink became military-relevant by accident. Guowang is built with that role in mind.

And this carries consequences far beyond China. Starlink has been resisted by authoritarian governments precisely because it undermines censorship regimes. Guowang offers them an alternative — internet connectivity consistent with state control.

In a world where governments can choose their satellite provider based on ideology, the divide between open and closed societies will harden both on Earth and in orbit.

The pace of China’s build-out is equally telling. To mount five launches in just over three weeks required a tightly coordinated industrial base: satellite factories, multiple rocket lines, launch sites, tracking stations, and range safety infrastructure working in sync.

This is the muscle of scale and resilience — the ability to replenish quickly in peace or war. Satellites in low Earth orbit are short-lived and vulnerable. The side that can replace them fastest holds the upper hand.

The genuine concern is not the existence of another global constellation — redundancy is healthy. The danger lies in the values embedded within it.

The internet that grew under democratic systems, however flawed, carried with it a bias toward openness. A system designed to privilege state power will make very different assumptions about speech, privacy, and access. Once nations buy into such infrastructure, switching is prohibitively expensive. Politics follows pipes — or in this case, satellites. 

This is not a problem for the 2030s. At China’s current pace, Guowang could have hundreds of satellites operational within two years and thousands by the decade’s end. For this, China must work hard, as the Guowang program needs significant acceleration to meet its 2032 deadline for half the constellation. Similarly, Qianfan has launched only 90 satellites against its target of 648 by the end of 2025. If achieved as planned, each satellite is another brick in a new wall — or a bridge, depending on who controls it.

So, what must democracies do?

First, call it what it is. This is not just commercial rivalry but a fight over the plumbing of the information age. Decisions taken 500 kilometres above Earth will dictate who can speak, listen, or cut others off.

Second, build credible alternatives. Satellite internet must be affordable and accessible in the developing world. Respect sovereignty but defend fundamental freedoms. If democracies don’t provide an option, others will.

Third, expand launch capacity. SpaceX has revolutionised access, but no strategic domain should depend on one company or man. Spread capacity across allies, build surge potential, and prepare for rapid replenishment.

Finally, update the rules. Today’s space laws were written for a world of hundreds of satellites, not tens of thousands. Without new agreements on traffic, spectrum, debris, and military behaviour, we risk collisions and an orbital cold war.

What once seemed improbable is now reality: Beijing is mounting a serious challenge to American and allied dominance in space. Sun Tzu advised shaping the battlefield before the first blow. That is precisely what a dense, dual-use, rapidly replenishable satellite constellation does — it sets the rules before the contest begins.

India cannot afford to sit this out. Our ₹1,200 crore earth observation push is a start, seeding sovereign capability and a private space ecosystem. But this must be scaled with intent. For now, our satellite internet access depends on partners like Starlink. The geopolitics, however, are unambiguous. India needs its constellation — built on Indian terms — if it is to shape the skies rather than be shaped by others.

(Y Nithiyanandam is Professor&Head- Geospatial Research Programme, Takshashila Institution.)

Views are personal and do not represent the stand of this publication.