Politics | Why Suu Kyi is right in saying ‘genocide’ claims are incorrect

Land records of the Arakan area (now Rakhine state) indicate that the total Bengali Muslim population of the region, which was no more than 60,000 in 1872, rapidly doubled by 1911 and then grew exponentially because of the British need for cheap labour. This created massive local resentment (a chapter of history not to be dealt with here).

Right from the start of their fragmented history their relationship with their neighbours has been problematic. Historically there have been several spikes in violence, but none were more formative than the role played by them in World War II and during Burmese independence.

While the Buddhists largely sided with the Japanese during World War II (under general Aung San's leadership), the Rohingyas became part of the Lord Wavell's ‘stay behind’ strategy. The point of this was to arm and sue the Rohingyas as a potent ‘behind the lines’ guerrilla force to attack the Japanese rear. While arms were supplied for fighting Japan — invariably issues got entangled in local politics and a cycle of violence saw the killing of over 20,000 Buddhists by the Rohingyas.

The Pakistan Angle

If being seen as ‘anti-Burmese collaborators’ wasn’t bad enough, things only got worse by the end of the war. Starting in 1946, with MA Jinnah’s support and in collaboration with the Pakistan movement, a large scale campaign of violence began seeking secession of the Arakan to what was to become East Pakistan.

In short, from the very get go, the Rohingyas never wanted to be part of the Burmese national project and the Burmese for their part agreed with the Rohingyas. In that sense the closest analogy for us Indians would be — what if after the 1946 and 47 elections, if the Pakistan project had failed and ‘Pakistan’ remained a part of India? While political correctness prevents discussion of such uncomfortable alternate histories? The reality remains that such events poisoned the well irreparably. In that sense Arakan/Rakhine was the Pakistan that failed to secede.

The Rohingyas for their part faced systematic persecution, significant rebellions and were the target of brutal law and order operations, but it is important to note that their national identity as they perceive it was and remains radicalised. A succession of violent movements that have been spawned have all used the nomenclature of jihad and have restored to unfettered ethnic targeting and terrorism.

Terror Links

This is where the entry of ARSA (Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army) changed the dynamic completely. While there is significant evidence to prove linkages with Pakistan, the linkages of its leadership to the Lashkar-e-Toiba are the most prominent. Like every single violent Rohingya movement before, they have used civilians — mostly Muslims Rohingyas as human shields and every time it has led to the civilians bearing the brunt. However, unlike previous movements, the messaging and use of international law by the ARSA, has been extremely sophisticated, invoking concepts of proportionality (curiously first introduced by the Islamic State into the jihad dictionary) provocation, etc.

This shows a clearly discernable and systematic pattern of initiating attacks against the Burmese Army, precisely to trigger a disproportionate retaliation — where civilians bear the brunt. What is amazing is that within hours of the start of a Burmese Army retaliation, the ARSA releases statements using the buzzwords: right to self-defence, proportionality and human rights. Anybody who seriously studies the ARSA cannot but be taken aback by the planned use of violence aimed at triggering a genocide and consequent internationalisation.

This is where we need to realise that the ARSA understands the difference between first world warfare — using complex intelligence gathering and highly-trained soldiers to precisely target combatants — and third world, low-technology warfare that uses badly trained soldiers. The Rohingyas tailor their messaging to an audience that knows the former but in a situation that is the latter. Let’s be clear, third world warfare is ugly and the Burmese Army are no saints.

A Complex Narrative

This is exactly what Suu Kyi has said in the Hague — admitting to the fact that there have been serious excesses and that those guilty will be punished as per law; that it is a violent nasty conflict but it cannot constitute genocide, when at least 300,000 Rohingyas remain in Myanmar, and Myanmar agrees to take back the refugees.

If you have people who understand the complexity of this, then you will have a rational policy towards Burma and the Rohingyas informed by facts. If you fall for the genocide line, then you are being informed by emotions and activism, and feelings never make for good policy.

Abhijit Iyer-Mitra is a defence economist and senior fellow at Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi. Twitter: @iyervval. Views are personal.