The security establishment ensured the peaceful conduct of the Lok Sabha poll, Amarnath and other yatras, and the assembly elections by pre-empting terrorist actions. A high level of security alertness to shield the democratic processes from terrorist attacks was combined with a proactive approach to seeking contact with holed-up terrorist modules and launching multiple seek and destroy operations.
Consequently, the Pakistani terrorists were pushed back and into the higher, thickly-forested reaches of Jammu division in the Pir Panjals. Though terrorists were eliminated in small numbers (1-2), the effect was that Pakistani handlers could not vitiate the assembly elections, even in the remote areas.
This would seem somewhat surprising, given the series of lethal ambushes suffered by the Army in Jammu division since October 2021. My analysis of 15 significant terrorist attacks and ambushes indicates that if a battalion is hit once, terrorists flee to another area, lie low and then move onto the next battalion’s area for targeting, after an interval of a few weeks. The terrorists selected targets where the security forces were complacent and alert levels low. Such careful selection ensured ambush success and safe exit with solid support from a thought-through network of over-ground workers (OGWs).
Limited numbers at work
The conduct of the elections has brought to the fore that terrorists do not possess sufficient numbers, as of now. Assessments by the Multi-Agency Centre and then DGP RR Swain put the number of terrorists in the state as less than 150, of whom an overwhelming proportion are Pakistanis. The professional handlers of the terrorists in Pakistan — the ISI and the SSG — do not want to expend the limited resources they have inserted in Jammu division by involving them in frontal attacks on security forces, who are on high alert.
As a corollary, the current terrorism mode is at complete variance with the fidayeen actions seen in the earlier phases of the 1990s-2000s when their numbers were in the few thousands. Handlers are instead focussed on operating under the radar to conserve terrorist numbers, grow the substantive OGW network, extend the ammo and provisions grid of dumps, and consolidate hold in the higher reaches till the time is ripe for the next stage of guerrilla warfare.
Looking for chinks, waiting for pressure to ease
Indian security responses are being tested in the current phase. Critical to the success of the Pakistani plan is that during its consolidation phase, the Indian establishment does not relentlessly pursue a proactive operational mode and high-alert security grid. This is evident in terrorists not inflicting very high casualties- maximum of five- to the Army in one action (namely, Uri, Pulwama) so as to stay under threshold levels and not invite a major cross-LOC retaliation by India.
Terrorism planners are placing expectations on the security drive ebbing in momentum after the assembly elections are done and dusted. Mutilations, beheadings and dismemberment of a local’s body by terrorists is deliberate and aimed at establishing deterrence in the minds of pursuing troops and security force informers.
Since July 2024, the security forces have made headway in arresting OGWs, dismissing government employees linked with narco-terrorism and unearthing hideouts, including an underground one housing several gas cylinders in Rajouri. The security establishment plans to consolidate its gains by targeting terrorists when they retreat from the snow-bound heights in the coming winter to seek food and shelter in the hamlets below.
Game plan’s to increase numbers
The long-term Pakistani game plan, supported by China, is assessed as heading towards the “stealthy induction” of higher numbers of terrorists in Jammu’s higher reaches, including more serving and retired Army personnel at the core, to “consolidate hold” over dominating ground.
Since the operational space is constrained for terrorists in the Kashmir Valley and the corresponding LOC sector, Pakistani handlers are seeking to exploit the gaps and the dormancy that had set in the Jammu sector. This manoeuvre has a parallel. In 1998-’99, before Kargil, the Army had brought terrorism down to an all-time low in Kashmir due to relentless operations. But Pakistan opened up a front in the gap-ridden Kargil LOC sector to divert Army formations from Kashmir and relieve pressure on the terrorists.
Kargil had been divested of the committed 28 Infantry Division in 1991 when it was moved to Kupwara on the CI-Ops (counterinsurgency operations) and counter-infiltration grid. In turn, fidayeen waves swept into the gaps in the CI-Ops grid created by the move of 8 Mountain Division from North Kashmir to Drass-Mashkoh in May-June 1999.
Fallout of Galwan
Similarly, the Reasi-headquartered Uniform Force of the Rashtriya Rifles was moved to Eastern Ladakh in the wake of the Galwan clash.
Were the terrorist planners to succeed in inducting a critical level of hardened combatants in the higher reaches of Jammu division, their eviction from the densely-forested reaches will entail heavy casualties and the use of area weapon systems that will create a media sensation, i.e. a mini-Kargil like battle scenario that draws in disproportionately-high resources to restore the situation. Terrorists could hold the Jammu peaks and plant anti-national flags for social media dissemination.
Since Kashmir tends to hog the lion’s share of attention, just as Tiger Hill in Op Vijay, and its current period of relative peace has won laurels, terrorist planners have restrained actions in the Valley. Large deployments of forces in Kashmir have mostly bagged the cannon fodder: local Kashmiri terrorists. Under this diversion, terrorist planners seek to build up under stealth in the neglected Jammu division by investment of critical resources and simultaneously penetrate the “relatively quiet” and contiguous Punjab sector for induction of weapons, terrorists and drugs.
The recent operations in Kishtwar’s higher mountains served as a timely warning. The security forces found the going extremely challenging and nailed not a single terrorist in extended operations in September 2024 after having deployed the Para SF, Rashtriya Rifles and the Police SOG, along with multiple aerial surveillance platforms. The small, agile terrorist modules of young Pakistanis engaged briefly, dispersed and exited successfully by using broken ground, caves and precipitous terrain engulfed by monsoonal flora.
Jammu’s intelligence gaps- Chinese link
The ground level and human intelligence grid had withered over the years of Jammu peace. On the other hand, terrorist handlers had recognised the vacuum and regenerated the OGW network with substantive assistance from the narco-terror mafia. Hence, the missing ground connect which led to a series of fatal ambushes of Army convoys.
Handlers devoted attention to setting up communication systems that cannot be easily penetrated by the security establishment’s electronic warfare and signals intelligence. At the high end is the use of Chinese Ultra-Sets by select terrorist modules in Jammu that incorporate several layers of encryption and link up with Chinese satellites.
At the base level of terrorist communication is the opportunistic seizure of the cellphone of a local and use its cellular data to set up a hot-spot for the terrorist’s SIM-less cellphone. Using encrypted messenger apps, the terrorist then communicates and transfers data to Pakistan, such as ambush videos for release on Telegram channel.
Vikram Jit Singh has extensive experience as war correspondent and reported counter terrorism operations live while posted in Srinagar. Views are personal and do not represent the stand of this publication.
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