India walks the SCO tightrope at Tianjin

Yet, while optics around Modi’s visit may suggest a thaw in India-China ties, the reality is more complex. India is not walking into Tianjin to “mend fences” with Beijing in the bilateral sense. Instead, it is leveraging the SCO as a multilateral platform to balance competing interests, reinforce its stance on terrorism, and deepen engagement with partner countries in Central Asia, all while keeping a cautious eye on the shifting global order.

Walking the tightrope

In the last few years, India’s participation in the SCO has been marked by dilemmas as the organisation hasn't met New Delhi’s expectations. On one hand, India recognises the value of a Eurasian forum that brings together the interests of Russia, China, and the Central Asian states. On the other hand, India has remained sceptical because of the organisation's reticence in addressing India's interests, particularly on cross-border terrorism.

It is important to note that the SCO’s stated core objective of combating extremism, terrorism, and separatism is also among the major motives behind India’s SCO membership. Consequently, Pakistan-sponsored cross-border terrorism has never been addressed in the forum. While the discussion of bilateral disputes remains explicitly prohibited by the SCO Charter, yet SCO’s Joint statement condemning Israel’s attacks on Iran remains ironic to its core principle. The Statement omitted mention of the April 2025 Pahalgam terror attacks, which was not viewed positively by New Delhi.

This year’s Summit has become a courtyard where India will step in with pragmatic optimism. Modi’s visit to Tianjin comes against the backdrop of New Delhi’s recent efforts to recalibrate ties with Beijing. The cautious thaw is reflected in several steps, from the Modi–Xi meeting in Kazan in 2024 to renewed border communication channels, openness to Chinese investment highlighted in this year’s Economic Survey, the resumption of the Kailash Mansarovar Yatra, and reciprocal high-level visits. Improved connectivity, including eased travel regimes, further signals a steady normalisation.

Beyond bilateralism

However, SCO’s significance for India cannot be read only through the lens of bilateral relations with its neighbours. In fact, the organisation represents a broader geopolitical hedge at a moment when India’s external environment is in flux.

First, Operation Sindoor has added urgency to India’s regional security assessment. The recent shifts in Asian geopolitics, reflected in the improving relations with China, can result in India's position on combating terrorism in the region receiving more agency from its SCO partners. For New Delhi, stabilising ties with its neighbours is critical to avoid multi-front vulnerability, even though China is close to Pakistan.

Second, the U.S. factor looms large. With Washington threatening steep tariffs if India continues oil trade with Russia, New Delhi faces an uncomfortable squeeze. Even amid Western sanctions, India’s trade with Russia remains unaffected, and Moscow continues to be a vital energy partner. But to avoid overexposure to Western economic pressures, India also sees value in intensifying its regional partnerships for a stronger Eurasian economy.

Third, the SCO offers India a bridge to landlocked and resource-rich regions like Central Asia. Energy security and its location make the region important for Eurasian connectivity. In this context, by being visibly active in the SCO, New Delhi can play an active role in Eurasian geopolitics and economics.

SCO’s changing role

The SCO has often been criticised as a “talk shop,” too divided internally to deliver on its ambitious security and economic mandates. Yet, its symbolic weight cannot be dismissed. For India, Tianjin comes at a time when the organisation itself is being tested.

SCO’s selective positions underscore its political asymmetries, often leaving India dissatisfied. And yet, New Delhi remains engaged. The reason is simple that SCO provides structured and recurring opportunities to interact with adversaries and partners alike, reducing the cost of regional diplomatic isolation.

India’s engagement is also about shaping the narrative. By pushing terrorism to the top of the agenda and voicing consistent objections to Pakistan’s role, New Delhi ensures its concerns are not sidelined, while maintaining ties with all the partners at the multilateral level.

Way forward

In the aftermath of the Pahalgam attack, New Delhi has consistently used multiple platforms to highlight its anti-terrorism stance, and this year India’s SCO agenda will be shaped largely by regional security concerns. At the same time, trade frictions triggered by Trump’s tariffs are expected to dominate the broader discussions at the Tianjin summit.

Modi’s visit does not imply a convergence of mutual strategic outlooks, but it's an avenue of rebuilding trust, which acts as a foundation of strengthening ties.

The SCO may not resolve India’s disputes, but it offers a valuable stage of dialogue. In a turbulent global order and power shifts, Indo-Chinese renewed engagement shows that the foreign policy is no longer about binaries of friendship or hostility. It is about managing contradictions, hedging risks, and keeping doors open- even with rivals. That is the quiet but significant message of both India and China at the SCO Summit in 2025.

(Ayushi Saini is a Research Consultant at Chintan Research Foundation. She researches on Central Asia.) Views are personal and do not represent the stand of this publication