India shouldn’t be unduly worried about a China-driven axis in South Asia

Bangladesh, however, cautioned that neither did the meeting signify the formation of any formal alliance mechanism, nor was it targeted at a third party. Even Guo argued that the meeting wasn’t meant to target a third party, only to manifest “genuine multilateralism.” Yet, that statement doesn’t inspire much confidence given that lead researchers at CPC-affiliated institutions, such as Liu Zongyi of the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies, have underscored the India angle that pushed this meeting.

In his latest article for Global Times, Liu wrote, “While India lacks the capacity to drive regional economic development, it remains reluctant to see external countries assist its neighbors in advancing their economic and social progress, as it seeks to preserve its geopolitical dominance.” It is against this backdrop that he argues for the need to allow for and appreciate the development opportunities a China-Pak-Bangladesh trilateral brings to the table.

It’s premature to assume India’s power is being challenged

Taking these developments and narratives, there are two realities to account for when thinking through what India should do next. The first is that even if China and Pakistan succeed in formalising the endeavour into a trilateral mechanism, there is nothing novel to the threat it would pose to India. This is especially considering that China-Pakistan economic and military interdependence is very much a fact of the neighbourhood’s dynamics.

Further, while Pak-Bangladesh relations are moving towards reconciliation under the Muhammad Yunus government in Dhaka, China and Bangladesh are building a “new stage” of partnership. Hence, for India, the challenge is obvious, and a trilateral mechanism is as good as a platform to air grievances and express shared interests in development and “win-win cooperation” as any other China runs with partners across the region. To jump to the conclusion that the mechanism will mightily challenge India’s role and power in the region would be premature and unconstructive.

That said, there is a second reality to account for. With Bangladesh, New Delhi cannot take the bet that it values China more than India. Commentary in India is now focusing on how Bangladesh and India have no outstanding territorial disputes, and that Dhaka’s press release on the trilateral meeting is a sign that it does not want a Sino-Pakistani-Bangladeshi axis.

But India must know better. With the Yunus government in power, there are visible signs that Bangladesh may find a strategic embrace of China more appealing, especially considering that it may not have outstanding territorial disputes with India, but there are religious tensions at play.

Not to mention, just a few of months ago, commentators were concerned with Yunus’ statement surrounding the landlocked nature of India’s northeastern states, equating it with him offering up the Indian Ocean Region to China. The fact is that the dust hasn’t settled, and all India can hope is its roles as first responder, lender of last resort, and trade facilitator is not lost on Dhaka.

Three dimensions to be balanced in securing interests

So India has a balance to strike between securing its interests and letting regional partnerships bloom without interference. The first aspect of this, would be to control the narrative. New Delhi could take a public stance on enabling regional economic growth while opposing any collusion between anti-India forces in the neighbourhood. Such a statement by the Ministry of External Affairs, for instance, may act as a show of force in the face of narratives emanating from China, and may clarify that India is observant and willing to act in its interests.

Secondly, given that the process of ensuring continuity in implementation of existing MoUs with Bangladesh may have been derailed by political instability, India must adopt flexibility in dealing with the government of the day. In most neighbours’ cases, it is easy enough to observe that alternative governments come to power on anti-India narratives. Yet, China’s influence is too large to ignore. And in Bangladesh’s case, this is evident from a March 2025 statement, wherein Dhaka affirmed commitment to the One-China principle, promotion of the BRI, and expansion of joint infrastructure development projects with China.

Further, assuming that, unlike Pakistan, Bangladesh under Yunus is still in the hedging and betting phase, India could offer alternate modes of partnership to it in the same domains taken up at the trilateral meeting. Especially in terms of people-to-people exchanges, there may be an opportunity for India to open up to Bangladeshi talent coming to India, especially in the textile manufacturing domain. In the digital economy space, India may want to consider commercialising the deployment of UPI in neighbouring economies. NPCI has already undertaken such measures in Bhutan and Sri Lanka, so Bangladesh too, could be a viable destination.

India’s challenge extends beyond this particular trilateral, and revolves around balancing three things: lack of political stability in the neighbourhood, need for regional economic growth, and respect for sovereign decision-making by all actors involved. Based on these three factors, regional mechanisms excluding India cannot be prevented from blooming. The only goal should be to develop as much leverage as is necessary to have India represented on more tables than not.