Dhaka Diary 2: Will an election change anything?

Inflation remains high at over 9 percent. It’s declining, but on the back of low growth. There are fears the economy may hit a low-level equilibrium. (“Low imports, low confidence, low growth: Is Bangladesh in a slow-burning crisis?” TBS, June 1.) As of May 2025, foreign exchange reserves ($25.8 billion) are at the same level Sheikh Hasina left them in July 2024. The International Monetary Fund (IMF), however, pegs reserves at $20.5 billion. The official unemployment rate is the highest since COVID. Unofficially, many have lost jobs.

A huge disparity between official claims and reality makes a fair assessment difficult. Officially, gas supplies are up. But Uber drivers and industries complain of business losses due to the low availability of gas. A check on booking platforms shows that, adjusted for inflation, hotel rates are down or stagnant.

Is an election a meaningless exercise? 

Hasan’s restaurant is in distress due to low footfalls. And, most importantly, he has lost all appetite for elections and political change.

“I don’t expect an election to take place anytime soon—and even if it does, it won’t bring any promise for us,” he said. He was not enamored with the Yunus regime; he was merely afraid of more uncertainty and had grown status quoist. His immediate fear was the oncoming July Resolution. If implemented, the charter may absolve the Yunus administration of prevailing constitutional and legal responsibilities and set the boundaries for the future course of politics and governance in Bangladesh.

We were speaking barely a week after the army chief, General Waker-Uz-Zaman, gave a December 2025 deadline for holding elections. A week later, on June 6, Dr Yunus announced an election in April during a national address ahead of Eid. But that didn’t end the debate. Dr Yunus ignored demands from the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), the largest outfit in the fray after the ban on the Awami League. An angry BNP standing committee accused Dr Yunus of “crossing the limits of political decency in his choice of language” during the June 6 speech. “July is past. We’re in for a power struggle,” Hasan said.

In fact, going by the sequence of events, the interim administration did not listen to anyone except the newly formed National Citizen Party (NCP), led by student leaders from the July 2024 protests, and Jamaat-e-Islami. Both expressed satisfaction at the election announcement. Jamaat has secured a maximum of four percent of votes in the last three decades. The League and BNP jointly commanded roughly 80 percent of votes in elections between 1991 and 2009. The distant third, Jatiyo Party, was not invited to any political dialogue in the last 10 months. NCP leaders even demanded a ban on them.

So why did Hasan lose interest in elections? For two reasons:

First, the BNP was a sure-shot for power back in July. They still are, but public opinion about them has deteriorated since. Under pressure from Hasina, BNP activists had gone underground for the past seven to eight years. Now back on the turf, many are in a hurry to make up for lost time. Ask any taxi driver in Dhaka—they’ll accuse the BNP of petty extortion (chandabaji).

The BNP does not deny the allegations. Acting chairman Tarique Rahman gave the Yunus administration a free hand to act against errant activists. He also expelled over 3,000 members. A top city editor confirmed the trend but also pointed to the possibility of false-flagging. It’s in the interest of both the NCP and Jamaat to portray BNP in poor light.

Second, and more importantly, Hasan’s biggest disillusionment is this: Where is the choice?

The BNP–Awami League binary brought ideological balance to Bangladeshi politics. The League followed a clear pro-Liberation, relatively secular ideology. The BNP is more like a club—it houses elements from across the ideological spectrum. This heterogeneity once sustained the BNP-Jamaat coalition against the League. Now that the League is out, the two have parted ways. The resulting political vacuum has potentially expanded the space for Jamaat and other Islamic forces—particularly among the youth.

A reputed Dhaka-based outfit recently conducted a survey among 15–35-year-olds. It showed high support for Islamic politics. Roughly 15 percent said they would vote for the League—if it were allowed to contest. The study results are yet to be published, but the concern is palpable. “We always had limited choices. Now we are left with an even smaller bouquet,” Hasan said.

‘Power hungy’ student leaders

To commoners in Dhaka, the “power-hungry” student leaders are the biggest disappointment of July. “Should you vote for the NCP?” I asked a sharp and articulate 25-year-old Christian who had joined the July protests after the Prime Minister “cried” for the metro station (PM Hasina cries upon visiting vandalised metro station, TBS, July 25). “I was angry at her lack of empathy for the dead and jumped into the protest. Some people used the opportunity to grab power and vandalise our history and culture,” he said, referring to the student-led demolition of the Bangabandhu Memorial Museum at Dhanmondi on February 5.

“Should an election do any good to us?” he asked me.

(This is second of the series on the ground situation in Bangladesh. The first part was published on June 9.)