HomeNewsOpinionDefence | Agni V is a real game changer in the regional strategic scenario

Defence | Agni V is a real game changer in the regional strategic scenario

The DRDO must take the Agni programme to the logical next step: the development of a full-fledged ICBM with a range of 8,000 kilometres or more

November 02, 2021 / 18:30 IST
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Representative image
Representative image

The successful testing of the surface-to-surface Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM), Agni-V, from APJ Abdul Kalam Island in Odisha on October 27 brings India closer to developing the Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) technology. The test-firing of the missile was conducted by its user agency, the tri-service Strategic Forces Command.

The Agni-V has a range of 5000 kilometres, which is 500 kilometres short of an ICBM’s range of 5,500 kilometres. Only a handful of countries in the world like the United States, Russia, China, France, Britain, and — unofficially — Israel have the ICBMs in their arsenals. Not that nomenclature would be weighing heavily on the minds of India’s defence planners as they celebrate this remarkable achievement.

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At launch, the Agni-V’s three-stage, solid fuel-engine powers it to an altitude of 500 kilometres before it follows a ballistic trajectory, traversing one-eighth of Earth’s circumference of more than 40,000 kilometres in 20 minutes. This enables Agni-V to reach, and hit targets anywhere in Asia and Europe with great accuracy. As the Agni-V is canisterised, it is easy to store, and can be fired from mobile launchers, and trains from anywhere in the subcontinent, which makes it highly manoeuvrable, and hard to track by enemy missiles.

The Agni-V’s Multiple Independently-Targeted Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV) capability also makes it an ideal test-bed for more powerful variants of the missile. A MIRV weapon consists of a number of nuclear warheads carried on a single ICBM, each warhead zeroing in on a separate target. It is extremely difficult for air defence systems to shoot down MIRV targets than to intercept single missiles. To further reduce the odds of MIRV warheads being intercepted, decoy re-entry vehicles can also be deployed. India's ‘no first use’ nuclear policy is based on second-guessing a full-fledged nuclear strike which could destroy most of the enemy’s nuclear arsenal. MIRVs form a key second line of defence in such a scenario.