China’s façade of neutrality in Russia-Ukraine conflict

Further, when China announced its 12-point peace plan on the ‘political settlement of Ukrainian crisis’ in February 2023, Ukraine avoided an outright criticism of the plan since it perceived many components in the plan to be in its favour. These included provisions like respecting the sovereignty of all countries, ceasing hostility, resuming peace talks, resolving humanitarian crises, protecting civilians and prisoners of war (POW), and keeping nuclear power plants safe. Ukraine was also apparently satisfied if not enamoured with China’s support for the ‘Black Sea Grain Initiative’ that allowed Ukraine to export wheat to international market to tide over its resource scarcity problems.

Yet, behind the veil of neutrality, China’s security and diplomatic practices along with informal realpolitik heavily impede its formal positioning on the war.

In Russia’s corner where it counts

First, its statements and formal positioning in the United Nations tacitly support the Russian stand while avoiding any support to Ukraine’s position even if many of them were genuine. In February this year, for instance, while China supported a US-authored resolution calling for ‘swift end to the conflict’; it abstained from a Ukrainian resolution calling Russia for ‘withdrawing all military forces from Ukraine’. China’s reiteration of three principles on UN platform such as ‘no extension of battlefield, no escalation of the fighting and no provocation by any party’, actually favour Russia’s dominant position in the war, including capture of significant Ukrainian territory.

Second, China has played a pivotal role in diluting the impact of the US-led sanctions on Russia. It does not support sanctions that has no UN authorisation. In 2024 alone, China imported 300 million barrels of Russian crude oil. China has also expanded the supply-chain logistics with Russia that has enabled Moscow to combat the sanction regime. While China has been supplying vital spare parts to the Russian domestic military industrial complex (MIC) to cope up with the war-related demands, Ukraine has also alleged that China is supplying lethal weapons to Russia that are reaching the war front.

Third, China sees the Russia – Ukraine War as an opportunity to promote its global security initiative (GSI) that is actually aimed at poking holes in the US-led security architecture and partnerships. These are being done, as the US-China Commission (USCC) has alleged, ‘under the guise of a set of principles that are full of platitudes, empty on substantive steps, for contributing to global peace or resolving existing disputes like the war in Ukraine’. By tacitly facilitating Ukraine’s weakening through different ways and means, China is using every possible opportunity, even if symbolic, to convey a powerful message to the US-led (now European countries-led) alliance.

Chinese soldiers in the battlefield is part of larger plan

It is in this context that the alleged role of Chinese soldiers in Ukraine assumes importance. There may not be a cogent justification for Chinese soldier-volunteers to fight against Ukraine, but China would not send them without a long-term strategy. It must be part of a calibrated strategy that is yet to emerge in public domain. Perhaps China intends to encourage other countries to send more volunteers to fight against Ukraine since it didn’t condemn the North Korean soldiers getting involved in the war and simply looked the other way! It could also be an attempt to indulge in some alliance-building exercise with Russia for futuristic purpose. China may be sending a small contingent of soldier-volunteers, but expects Russia to keep mum or support it when China decides to go the whole hog on Taiwan at some stage in future.

It could also be a ploy to tease the other side through small irritants. This will come handy when China gradually positions itself as the numero uno challenger to the US in the new Cold War, very much like the Soviets during the classical Cold War days!

Although Ukraine is peeved at Chinese interference in the war wherein the soldier-volunteers are just a representative example, it is debatable if Ukraine will make a bigger issue of this. Ukraine’s policy is perhaps to deal with each Chinese irritant in a standalone mode without losing the larger picture of China playing a significant role in war termination activities. As a rising military super power, Chinese neutrality, even if it’s a pretence, matters for agenda-setting in international relations in general and early termination of Russia – Ukraine War in particular.

With the US weaning away from Ukraine under President Trump, Ukraine would like to keep China in good humour to prevent a troika working against it. The last thing Ukraine would like to see is China ganging up with the US and Russia and dictating terms of peace to it!

In all probability, Ukraine will let go of the issue of soldier-volunteers as a one-time irritant. Ukraine will perhaps make diplomatic hue and cry every time it comes across instances that violate Chinese claims of neutrality. Perhaps that will prevent Sino – Russian understanding from metamorphosing into an informal alliance and adversely affect Ukraine.

Note: The author is in the Indian Defence Accounts Service. Views are personal and do not represent the stand of this publication.