Ayman al-Zawahiri killing was a great success of a bygone era

The strike itself required penetrating unfriendly airspace, probably from a base in the Persian Gulf or perhaps Central Asia. After the attack, US intelligence operatives on the ground in Kabul reportedly confirmed Zawahiri’s death.

This investment was undoubtedly justified, if only to show, as Biden remarked, that “no matter how long it takes, no matter where you hide, if you are a threat to our people, the United States will find you and take you out.” The operation, like the one that killed Osama bin Laden 11 years ago, is also a window into the formidable capabilities the US developed to locate and neutralise enemies in some of the least accessible places on earth.

Following 9/11, the Pentagon vastly expanded its special operations forces, skilled at killing or capturing terrorist leaders and disrupting the networks on which they relied. The intelligence community used human and technological assets, along with partnerships with friendly and not-so-friendly nations, to track down extremists.

The US created a drone fleet that it used to reach into Pakistan, Yemen, and other inhospitable areas; it developed weapons, such as the missile that got Zawahiri, which could kill targets with remarkably little collateral damage. A network of bases, large and small, in greater West Asia and beyond provided the logistical footprint for these activities.

The results could be very impressive. Sooner or later, the world’s most prominent jihadists — bin Laden, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, Anwar al-Awlaki and others — were, to use the favoured euphemism, “taken off the battlefield.” Lethal strikes eliminated countless bomb-makers, facilitators, and planners, frequently forcing those who remained to concentrate on keeping themselves alive.

This capacity for targeted killing became all the more important as US’ objective shifted from transforming societies in greater West Asia to simply pummeling extremist organisations so that they could not easily operate. Critiques that Washington was simply playing Whac-A-Mole notwithstanding, progress toward the tactical objective of degrading terror groups translated into progress toward the strategic objective of preventing attacks against the US homeland.

Yet man-hunting on this scale was immensely expensive: It often required paying millions of dollars — and sometimes many multiples of that — to track down a particular quarry. These investments gradually became prohibitive as other pressing geopolitical priorities emerged.

In 2018, Gina Haspel, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, announced that her organisation was pivoting away from counterterrorism and toward competition with China and Russia. The Defence Department and US special operations forces are making similar shifts.

Each of the last three US Presidents sought to reduce the resources and attention devoured by counterterrorism. Finally, the withdrawal from Afghanistan forced Washington to part with some of the military presence that provided ready access to extremists, although US forces remain in Iraq, Syria, Somalia, and other danger spots.

The Zawahiri strike isn’t the end of the US’ struggle with terrorism, not least because threats persist, from Afghanistan to Africa. Yet it is perhaps more a tribute to a prior era than to the present one.

The successful mission reveals a great deal about the tools the US developed to wage the war on terrorism in the period after 9/11. What it reveals about the efficacy of counterterrorism policy in a moment of competing priorities and fewer resources is harder to say.

Hal Brands is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist. Views are personal, and do not represent the stand of this publication.