Cho La 1967: How 10 JAK Rifles held the line against China in a forgotten high-altitude clash

After a year of relative calm, the situation changed on July 25, 1967. A large PLA group with patrol dogs began setting up makeshift fortifications opposite Cho La, signalling hostile intent.

The Cho La post commander, Major Saroop Singh Jamwal, directed 2/Lt A.C. Chanda with a section from ‘D’ Company to occupy Point 15440, the highest position where Indian and Chinese forces stood eyeball-to-eyeball.

An administrative base was established at Tamze, around 18 km from battalion headquarters, while a battalion base was created at the Hut Area, at the foot of the Cho La defences. Stores were dumped there while the road was open.

The task of 10 JAK RIF was clear: build the administrative base, conduct stocking and fencing of defences, and return by October 1, 1967, for its Raising Day at Chhangu HQ.

Lt Col Mahatam Singh personally oversaw progress, often staying at the picquets for days, surveying fence lines, hammering iron pickets, and helping men lay barbed wire. His leadership style was hands-on, by example.

The fencing and stocking operations were under Major Saroop Singh Jamwal, son of Major Ajit Singh, VrC of 6 JAK Infantry. He not only had to manage the logistical grind but also handle the Commanding Officer’s sudden visits.

The Chinese were so close that they taunted Indian soldiers laying pickets, shouting “Si Si Mao Tse Tung China,” asserting ownership. Major Saroop countered calmly, often negotiating directly with the Chinese commander. PLA troops blasted Hindi propaganda on loudspeakers, urging Indian soldiers to leave. To counter this, Major Saroop instructed men to eat their high-altitude rations—meat, eggs, rich meals—out in the open, projecting discipline and well-being.

On one occasion, Lt Col Mahatam Singh bathed in an icy pond near Cho La in just his boxers before prayers. Chinese soldiers, heavily coated, gaped at the bizarre sight. Their political commissar asked Major Saroop who this VIP was. Without missing a beat, Saroop replied: “Indian Mao Tse Tung.”

Raising Day preparations

The battalion was preparing to celebrate Raising Day on October 1, 1967. Relief was scheduled: 7/11 Gorkha Rifles under Lt Col K.B. Joshi would assume responsibility.

On September 30, after briefing Lt Col Joshi, Lt Col Mahatam returned to HQ for the Raising Day havan. Command passed to 2IC Major K.G. Nair. ‘A’ Company under Major S.C. Dogra held Picquet 15440, while ‘D’ Company under Major Saroop held Cho La Pass, Rai Gap, and Saddle. Subedar Waryam Singh commanded Cho La post.

The morning of October 1 was quiet. Lt Col Joshi went out for his usual walk towards Cho La Post. Meanwhile, handovers were causing delays, especially at Rai Gap and Cho La Post.

The battle erupts

At 0925 hrs, bursts of automatic fire rang out from 15440. Chinese flares went up, and firing erupted across the sector. Nobody knew who had fired first.

At HQ, the havan was interrupted when Capt Parkash Chand informed the CO. Leaving the pandit to continue prayers, Lt Col Mahatam rushed forward.

Cho La Post soon reported close-quarter fighting. Two men had already fallen: Rifleman Gagan Chand and Havildar Narinder Singh. Yet Subedar Waryam radioed calmly: “Saab ji, tusi phikar na karo. Main ithe hi rahna, sab thik hai.”

But 15440 had fallen. The Gorkha troops retreated without their commander. The Chinese now held the feature.

By 0950 hrs, Brigade HQ ordered Major Nair to move forward and assess. Confusion over command deepened—some posts had been handed over to 7/11 GR, yet their CO was missing. Meanwhile, Captain Manas Kumar Bhattacharya at Rai Gap was hit by MMG fire but refused evacuation until forcibly removed.

By noon, artillery was ready, but Lt Col Mahatam, now forward at Tamze, declined to escalate without trying to retake 15440. Using the cover of low clouds, he ordered Major Dogra to move on the post.

At 1500 hrs, Dogra’s section crept back into 15440. The Chinese had abandoned it, leaving spent cartridges but untouched Indian equipment. Lt Ram Singh Rathore, who had refused to leave his post, was found dead with the field telephone still in his hand.

By 1600 hrs, the position was firmly back in Indian hands. Not a single shot had been fired in the reoccupation.

Aftermath

Lt Col Mahatam Singh personally arrived at 15440, congratulating the men: “We could not have celebrated Raising Day in a better way.”

He visited every post—Rai Gap, Cho La, Saddle—meeting Subedar Waryam Singh and his men who had held their ground under fierce fire. Riflemen had died hauling ammunition inside the defences.

The battle cost 10 JAK RIF dearly: Riflemen Gagan Chand, Punjab Singh, Bishan Das, Prem Lal, Ram Krishan, Randhir Singh, Havildars Narinder Singh and Amar Nath were killed; ten others wounded. Enemy casualties were estimated at 44 killed, many wounded, and one captured.

Gallantry was recognised:

Lt Col Mahatam Singh: Mahavir Chakra
Major Saroop Singh Jamwal: Chief of Army Staff Commendation Card
Subedar Waryam Singh, Havildar Narinder Singh, Rifleman Gagan Chand: Vir Chakra

As Major Dogra later confessed: “I was more terrified of the Commanding Officer on my back than the Chinese in front.”

Mr Jai Samota is a writer and researcher from Rajasthan. He is the author of the only biography of Major Shaitan Singh, PVC, and has extensively studied the battles fought in the Ladakh sector during the 1962 war. His research interests also extend to the State Forces units of the pre-independence era.