Will post-Abe Japan help craft an Asian compact to counter China? Easier said than done.

Little gaggles of schoolchildren, unnaturally hushed, walk past the solemn wood and slate of Yasukuni shrine in Tokyo, solemnly honouring their nation’s war dead. Inside, they learn lies. The 1937 massacre at Nanjing, where 200,000 civilians were massacred and 20,000 women raped — part of a long chain of mass killings to punish cities which aided their national armies — is described in the shrine museum as an “incident”. The use of 200,000 Korean women as sex-slaves is erased from the story; there is mention of the Homfrey Ganj massacre in the Andamans.

This weekend, former Japanese Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe quietly visited the Yasukuni shrine, bowing his head before the souls of Japan’s Second World War dead, including over 1,600 convicted war-criminals, held guilty of everything from beginning the war of annihilation to crimes against humanity. In many parts of Asia, his gesture caused quiet concern.

For Abe, building a compact of Asian states with Japan at its core offered the sole prospect of containing the new superpower the new superpower that has arisen in their midst — and threatens them all. To many strategists in India, his idea held powerful appeal. The story of the shrine in Tokyo, helps understand why such an alliance is critical — and why actually building it is much more difficult than it might seem.

Yoshida Suga, Japan’s new Prime Minister, has come to power at arguably the most fraught phase in Asian geopolitics since the Second World War. Through Prime Minister Abe’s years in office — he ruled from 2006-2007 and 2012 to and then 2020 — he crafted a subtle foreign policy that balanced Japan’s relationship with the China and the United States. But he also invested in Japan’s relationship with key Asian partners like India and the Philippines, hoping to build strategic partnerships which could secure his country.

In some parts of Asia, though, raw memories of the Second World War — which, in Asia, began with Japan’s invasion of China in 1937 — made Abe’s nationalism deeply disturbing.

The case of South Korea is instructive. South Korea and Japan share similar strategic challenges: North Korea’s nuclear arsenal and China’s aggressive behaviour. They also have similar worries about the credibility of United States’ historic security guarantees. President Donald Trump has, for example, more than once complained about the costs of the 80,000 troops his country has stationed in South Korea and Japan. Few in either country believe Trump’s possible successor, Joseph Biden, will prove willing to enhance spending on the United States’ military commitments overseas.

Last year, though, South Korea’s Supreme Court issued a series of rulings allowing individuals to sue for reparations for forced labour during the Second World War. Two companies — Nippon Steel & Sumitomo Metal Corporation and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries — refused to pay compensation the South Korean courts granted war victims. Following this, the courts ordered seizure of their corporate assets.

In an ill-advised move, Abe’s government ordered restrictions on the export of certain products, like semiconductors and chemicals, used to manufacture smartphones. In addition, Tokyo removed South Korea from a white list of trading partners. Seoul responded with its own sanctions of its own, and South Korean consumers began boycotting Japanese brands like Uniqlo, Toyota and Honda.

Put simply, the ghosts of the past ended up almost levelling the Japan-South Korea relationship. In some Asian states, it is clear, the idea of Japan-led Asia isn’t all that much more comforting than a China-led Asia.

Abe’s foreign policy was driven by one core dilemma: the needed to balance the concerns of its principal strategic partner, and second-largest trading partner, with its largest trading partner, and principal threat. President Donald Trump’s rise to power made these choices ever-harder to manage. Trump complained that Japan’s trade policies were “not open and fair”. He also demanded a quadrupling of payments for United States troops on Japanese soil — critical to deterring Chinese aggression.

Last year, a Japanese aircraft carrier joined United States-led naval drills in waters claimed by China — a message not lost on Beijing. The former Prime Minister also sought to appease Trump with trade concessions, and by banning Huawei from a role in building in Japan’s 5G networks.

The People’s Liberation Army Navy responded by mounting relentless pressure in disputed waters all this summer — a strategy not dissimilar to that used in Ladakh. Narushige Michishita, Director of the Security and International Studies Programme at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies in Tokyo, recently told The Japan Times that “a new reality in which Chinese vessels maintain a fairly significant presence in the area so that maybe 10, 20 years later, China can claim it’s been controlling this area.”

Even as he faced this provocation, though, Abe simultaneously cultivated closer ties with Chinese President Xi Jinping, who was scheduled to make a high-profile state visit to Japan in April. The visit — deferred due to COVID-19 — is seen critical to helping Xi assert his legitimacy after the crisis sparked by the imposition of harsh national security laws in Hong Kong, and the stand-off with India on the Line of Actual Control in Ladakh.

The outreach to China underlined the lack of appetite in Japan for a decisive break with Beijing. Japan has moved after COVID-19 to address its supply-chain dependencies on China — notably, paying 87 companies to either bring production home, or expand it in Vietnam, Myanmar, Thailand and other Southeast Asian countries. But with $38 billion invested directly in China and nearly 14,000 firms operating there, for many in Japan a confrontation would be ruinous.

Abe’s China dilemma was compounded by the failure of his efforts to kick-start Japan’s economy. Japanese income growth under Abe remained similar to trends prior to his second and third term, averaging less than a percent per year. There were only small increases in labour force participation and almost no improvement in productivity. This failure limited Japan’s room for manoeuvre, and its strategic choices.

In an effort to buy Japan some strategic insurance, Abe invested heavily in his relationship with Prime Minister Narendra Modi. He saw India as a critical partner in pushing back against the China, and thus mitigating the threat to Japan should the United States withdraw from Asia.

Abe was to discover, though, that not all his new partners were equally enthusiastic. The Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte, for example, flatly refused to act against China after it landed combat aircraft on bases built on territory claimed by his country. “I cannot afford at this time to go to war. I cannot go into a battle which I cannot win. In the next 120 years, we can establish a naval force,” Duterte said.

How long Prime Minister Suga can maintain the delicate balancing act Abe crafted remains to be seen. There are any number of issues which could bring about a decisive break with Beijing, ranging from the Pentagon’s plans to station a new generation of medium-range missiles on Japanese soil, to a military confrontation erupting over the Senkaku islands. In addition, United States pressure could force Japan to restrict flows of key technologies to China — sparking retaliation.

The Yasukuni shrine isn’t important just as a repository of Japan’s troubled history. To every nation-state in Asia, it is a reminder of what can happen when uncontrolled nationalism coupled with massive economic power power a drive for regional hegemony. Abe’s dogged search for new Asian alliances was driven by the common need to contain this common threat.

Yet, the many cul-de-sacs Abe’s project confronted remind us of another important truth. Even as they fear Chinese power, most Asian states have no choice but to make their peace with Chinese wealth. Taiwan, Vietnam and Australia might be investing ever-more in military resources aimed at China, but their leaders are willing to give a great deal to avoid having to avoid using their arsenals. Like in 1937, they fear, imperialist aggression in Asia will be condemned by the United States — but that it won’t risk their own lives and wealth to enforce a principle.

As Asia’s second most powerful economic actor, Japan will be a critical actor in shaping the region’s response to China. But Suga — who, after all, served as Abe’s Cabinet Secretary — will likely be just as keen as his predecessor to avoid actions that could lead towards crisis. For now, then, there’s little prospect Japan will prove willing to lead the charge against China.