Politics | Xi Jinping’s Myanmar visit and the takeaways for India

On January 17, all of Myanmar was agog as Chinese President Xi Jinping landed in Naypyitaw, and became the first Chinese President to make a state visit in 19 years. The cheering children and the flag waving, however, could not quite capture the euphoria of an earlier period.

Following the 2017 Rohingya crisis, the West joined together to condemn the violence against the Muslim minority by the overwhelmingly Buddhist state, with the United States imposing sanctions against the military. Beijing, however, responded by signing Myanmar on to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and providing the military with the weapons. It was not just Beijing. If a 2019 UN Report is to be believed, India also provided equipment. That was probably New Delhi doing its bit to keep its foot in at the door, in a cautious push back to Beijing.

The power of Beijing’s presence was evident as a breathless state television that covered Xi’s meetings with President U Win Myint, State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi and military chief Min Aung Hlaing, and a raft of local leaders. Local media reported some 33 MoU's signed and a robust joint statement was announced.

There is much in that to worry most onlookers, particularly a paragraph that notes: “Both sides agreed to step up the ‘Belt and Road’ cooperation, push the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) to transit from concept sketching into concrete development, and endeavour to promote …the Kyaukphyu Special Economic Zone” . This centres on a deep sea port at Kyaukphyu, which will serve to provide the muscle to the planned economic corridor, just as Gwadar in Pakistan pins down the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).

The Kyaukphyu port is located along the troublesome Rakhine Muslim majority areas, and locals suspect that the ethnic cleansing of the area was prodded from Beijing. Other economic zones are envisaged in Shan and Kachin areas, as also infrastructure projects and connectivity, such as a high-speed railway that will link Kunming to Mandalay, a project abandoned earlier.

In recent years, Myanmar’s leaders had developed cold feet at the tightness of the Chinese embrace. The Kyaukphyu project was negotiated in 2015, with envisaged loans of $7.3 bn for the port and $2.7bn for the park. In 2018, the project was scaled back to a more manageable $1.4 bn, in a re-negotiation assisted by US experts. The details of the present agreement are yet to be made public, but there is no doubt that a degree of caution has set in.

The Chinese footprint is already large, with 18 hyrdo-power projects, jade and ruby mining, timber logging, and large property investments in building malls and high rise apartment blocks. Then there are the several hundred ‘Confucius Institutes’ that have sprung up, many now reworked as computer schools and funded by local Chinese communities.

Increasing Chinese presence has created resentment. For instance, construction for a large dam was stopped after local protests in Kachin state. Another mega real estate development along the Thaungyin river is referred to deprecatingly as ‘China town’. A recent survey by a Singaporean think-tank showed a 37.6 per cent rise in distrust of China, even though those polled still preferred Beijing over the US.

Beijing hopes for a far larger presence. Under the CMEC, China has proposed around 38 projects, but so far only a few have transitioned into an actual agreement. The problem is that Myanmar also fears Beijing’s role in its many ethnic conflicts. Beijing worries about the fallout on its own territory where similar ethnic communities live. Hard-headed analysts see China using insurgent groups as leverage, a role that it has replicated with some success against India and its own insurgent groups in the Northeast. Xi felt it necessary to deny that Beijing was arming the insurgents, thereby acknowledging widespread belief in its inimical role.

India has an effective ambassador in Saurabh Kumar, but he has a hard task ahead. While the $1,726 million committed for development is a pittance compared to Beijing’s billions, India’s Kaladan Multi-Modal Transport Project (that envisages connectivity between Myanmar and India) offers an important alternative to Naypyitaw. However, the project is threatened by insurgents suspected to be linked to groups funded by China.

Rohingya refugees, now in the cold after the Citizenship Amendment Act 2019, add another layer of instability, complicating New Delhi’s balancing act between its internal and external interests. A sliding Indian economy will prevent foreign assistance in all but the most vital areas. Meanwhile Japan, Singapore and Australia are weighing in with investment, but not enough.

India could use the Quad — a grouping of India, Australia, Japan and the US — to do some heavy lifting in the face of Chinese munificence. Even here, New Delhi hesitates, wary of alienating Beijing on the one hand, and fearing its presence on the other. This hesitation, which had vanished in the first Modi tenure, seems to have returned. For now, it seems that what Xi wants, Xi will get.

Tara Kartha is former director, National Security Council Secretariat. Views are personal.