India-China Strategic Rivalry: Army handling LAC friction well. Focus on three larger arenas

Indian operational resilience, tactical acuity and agile responses along the LAC, have had a sobering effect on any thoughts of adventurism on the part of the PLA.

Future historians may mark the Galwan Episode (events of May-June 2020 and the aftermath), not only as an inflection point in Sino-Indian relations, but also as a marker for the accelerated rejuvenation of the Indian military and the wider strengthening of its strategic poise. The Chinese aggression, in blatant violation of existing agreements (1993, 1996 & 2013 - central to the maintenance of peace and tranquillity along the LAC), may turn out to be one of the most ill-advised, mis-steps in the recent history of Chinese foreign/strategic policy.

India’s Strong Ground Game

The episode led to the Indian military re-balancing majorly from the country’s western borders to the LAC. Such re-balancing was accompanied by substantial upgradations in troop numbers, mechanised forces, airpower, offensive strike formations, ground-based firepower, ISR , air defence, reserves, logistics as also a concerted stepping up of the infrastructural wherewithal. The resultant military posture is a more accurate reflection of the prevalent threat. In India’s strategic calculus, Pakistan was always a mere pest, China was the manifest threat – our force dispositions now, reflect the obtaining reality.

The strengthened posture not only allows far greater operational flexibility but has also enabled the Indian Army to regain tactical ascendancy in many sectors of the LAC: along legacy friction points, in the buffer zones as also potential hot spots. The Indian Army’s offensive on the night of August 29-30, 2020 – the capture of the Kailash range overlooking the Chinese military garrison of Moldo, to include areas south of the Pangong-Tso Lake, signalled a new normal in our strategic outlook: a demonstration of our ability and will to take the fight to the PLA.

Our proactive, calibrated and sharp responses in the recent past similarly, (that must not be publicised for obvious reasons) to various PLA attempts to test the waters, not only demonstrate our renewed strength, confidence and resolve but also radiate very strong deterrence signatures – nobody knows this better than the PLA units/formations that operate along the LAC.

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China’s strategy along the LAC is witnessing its Mike Tyson moment, who famously observed – “everybody has a strategy till he is punched in the face.” Indian operational resilience, tactical acuity and agile responses along the LAC, have had a sobering effect on any thoughts of adventurism on the part of the PLA.

This does not mean that we let our guard down – eternal vigil is the price we must pay for our freedoms and our territorial sovereignty. We need to further strengthen our posture along the LAC in areas like persistent surveillance, capacities in long range precision, the long overdue transitions to digital warfighting and integrated theatres.

Three Arenas Beyond LAC

In the long term however, the fate of the Sino-Indian strategic rivalry will be determined by capacities in arenas beyond the LAC.

We must therefore pay greater heed to the larger strategic-military competition with China, wherein the growing lag is a matter of great concern. Three arenas should receive our immediate and concerted attention.

One, AI and the associated penumbra of technologies that are revolutionising all the grids of war. China has 238 large language models and is working vigorously to leverage generative AI to upgrade its military prowess in ISR, targeting and logistics. Indian investments in military applications of AI, Robotics and Quantum could be the secret sauce in our asymmetric addressing of the Chinese military juggernaut.

Two, strengthening the sinews of our military-technological ecosystem – the central lesson from Ukraine is that the side with the better ecosystem wins; an urgent audit of our stockpiles and inventories is called for.

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Three, the strategic imperative of making an immediate turn to the seas: China will soon have the largest navy in the world (400 ships) with growing power projection capacities. The challenges on the LAC notwithstanding, if we do not invest concurrently in maritime capacities, we may soon be faced with the prospect of a strategic squeeze, both, along the LAC and the seas.

China’s Weaknesses, India’s Deterrence Posture

While the challenges before India are numerous, China’s problems which need to be emphasised, are no less. There is widespread consensus that while in terms of aggregate GDP China has a distinct advantage by a long margin, in terms of growth rate India will continue to lead – the Indian tortoise will at some point also overtake the Chinese hare.

The very adverse demographics, the slump in the real estate sector, the spectre of unemployment, the killing of the animal spirits in the private sector consequent to the persecution of Jack Maa, the technological caging of China by the West, all point to the great adversity that imperils China’s rise.

China’s strategic challenges, too, are enormous. The burden of unifying Taiwan looms large in the Chinese mindspace; there are huge and visible divisions in the strategic community in Beijing as to whether the PLA is ready enough to do the Taiwan contingency. The recent sacking of eleven Chinese generals including the Defence Minister himself, amidst allegations of corruption, sleaze and informational compromise – most of them from its two signature projects, the Rocket Force and the Strategic Support Force – certainly do not augur well for the health of the Chinese defence enterprise.

Wisdom lies in leveraging the resultant respite (on account of multiple Chinese woes) to strengthen our Deterrence Posture further. The one area where the Chinese have displayed great skill in the recent past, is their ability to convert economic surpluses/technological advantages, into currencies of hard power. We must do likewise, at greater speed and scale.

A détente in the Sino-Indian relationship, is eminently possible, but only on the anvil of strong deterrence.

There are those that argue that Deterrence is costly. Well may be yes, but Wars are costlier – if you don’t believe me, ask the Ukrainians.

Lt Gen (Retd.) Raj Shukla was Army Commander, ARTRAC. He can be reached on Twitter @Gen_RajShukla or at rajshukla35@yahoo.com. Views are personal, and do not represent the stand of this publication.