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Govt may negotiate with IAEA, not finish deal: Yechury

Published on Tue, Nov 20, 2007 at 21:12 , Updated at Thu, Nov 22, 2007 at 14:00
Source : moneycontrol

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Sitaram Yechury, CPM Politburo Member and Rajya Sabha MP, said the change in the Left’s stance is on account of the change in the government’s stance.

 

Excerpts from CNBC-TV18’s exclusive interview with Sitaram Yechury:

 

Q: Until a few days ago, the Left was adamant that the government must not start talks with the IAEA because you deemed that this would amount to operationalisation of the deal. Suddenly you have now permitted the government to start talks. Why have you changed your position?

 

A: That’s because the government changed its position. Earlier the position was that if it goes in for talks with the IAEA, after that it was sort off autopilot. Once they conclude those talks, from there they go to the NSG. Once those are concluded, it would go to the US Congress. Once it is approved there, it would then come back to India for the approval of the Cabinet. If we had permitted them to go ahead, it meant that we are allowing the deal to go ahead.

 

But now, the government has said that even before they initialize or put their initials on the agreement with the IAEA, they will bring that agreement back to this Committee where we will dissect and discuss it. Only then will the government be allowed to go further.

 

Q: Let’s just explore this arrangement because that is the most important thing to understand. The government has agreed to start negotiations with the IAEA but will come back to you with the text of these safeguards that they have negotiated before they initial it?

 

A: That’s right.

 

Q: Before initial is critical?

 

A: Correct, it is very critical.

 

Q: Let’s explore and understand why initialing is so critical. Am I right in saying that a document that has been initialed, even though it has not been signed is an agreed document, which is frozen, and neither side can change it but an un-initialed document is incomplete and therefore it can be changed?

 

A: Absolutely correct. Therefore, when this document comes back to us, we have the right as well as the opportunity to amend whatever they have agreed before they take it back for having the initials put on.

 

Q: In effect, what the Left have done is to give government permission to start the process of negotiation with the IAEA but not actually complete it?

 

A: Correct.

 

Q: Which means that the document that the government emerges with, will not only be not initialed but it won’t be sufficient to take to the next stage i.e. the NSG?

 

A: Absolutely correct.

 

Q: The talk in the press that you opened a window to let the nuclear deal happen is in fact a misunderstanding of the position?

 

A: Completely. I may also add why did we even allow this. There were at least three commitments that were assurances. Let us say, the Prime Minister gave to Parliament which, according to us, have been violated in the present 123 agreement. One was regarding the question of fuel supplies in perpetuity. The other was in terms of the complete civilian nuclear corporation and the third was a question of us being saddled with safeguards in perpetuity when 123 can easily be terminated and there are various reasons for it.

 

The government’s point was unless they discuss with IAEA they will not be in a position to ensure whether these three can be acquired by India or not. Therefore, we have said go and discuss with them but before you initialize come back to this committee. Then, we will examine and on that basis further steps will be taken.
 

Q: Are you saying that the government believes they can overcome the inadequacies regarding these three points through the safeguards they hope to negotiate with the IAEA?

 

A: That’s what the government’s belief is.

 

Q: You are skeptical that this can be overcome?

 

A: Very skeptical.

 

Q: But you are prepared to let the government try?

 

A: That’s right.

 

Q: When the safeguards un-initialed come back to you, one of the things you are going to do is to look to see whether these three inadequacies have been overcome or whether they still continue?

 

A: That’s right.

 

Q: There is a sizeable section of the press that has always maintained that the Left has what they called a veto over the deal. The truth is that veto hasn’t been given up as some press suggests. In a sense that has been move from one position to another?

 

A: That’s right. I really don’t like this word veto. It is not something that we are say out of zidd. No, we are saying that we won’t allow the government to go on some sort of ideological predilections. This is why we are trying to persuade the government by saying this is not in its interest. Earlier we said, do not go to the IAEA, it has now shifted to saying go to the IAEA, do not initialize it, put your initials on the agreement, and come back to us before you do it.

 

Q: To use the word veto is a journalistic short form. Earlier, the veto was you couldn’t start talks with the IAEA, now the veto is you can’t conclude the talks. You need to come back to us if we approve of what you have done then and then only can you go ahead?

A: That’s right.
 

Q: Are you in affect going to stop the IAEA safeguards by objecting to them to provide cover to the government so that behind that cover they can honorably get out of the deal or do you really believe that the IAEA safeguards will themselves be inadequate for India’s need. Which will it be?

 

A: In our assessment, IAEA will not be in a position to give us fuel assurances in perpetuity.

 

Q: Suppose, the Indian government does pull rabbit out of the hat. They come back with safeguards, which meet all the three inadequacies. What is your basis for disagreeing with the safeguards negotiated?

 

A: What has been discussed is not only the safeguards in agreement. The 123 has a text, it has got a context and the context continues to remain.

 

Q: At that point, you wont have problems with safeguards because the safeguards might as well have met the needs that India has? You will have to then fallback to you context, which is to do with the wider strategic relationship and what others considered to be your general antipathy to America?

 

A: Not to America but to the American administration’s policies. It is an important distinction, it is not anti-Americanism, its anti-American imperialism as we would put it.
 

Q: The problem is that when you fallback from the text to the context, you could end up being hoist by your own petard because then the government will be able to say that the safeguards have catered for all India’s objective needs, yet you continue to have problems and those problems are not justified by the text. They are not justified by safeguards, they are justified by an ideological predilection and that could be embarrassing for you?

 

A: You see the context also includes the fact that no amount of safeguard agreement with the IAEA can remove the looming threat of the Hyde Act, which tells you that once the 123 is terminated, fuel supplies will seize. The IAEA cannot give me or give India that assurance.

 

Q: You are saying regardless of what the government can deliver in terms of the IAEA, your wider concerns about this strategic relationship and America’s hegemonic policies are in fact the dominating concerns?

 

A: Both are.

 

Q: But they are a dominating cause. You said that if a good safeguard is delivered, the others would still continue and still veto?

 

A: But that is because I firmly of the opinion that a good safeguards cannot be delivered.

 

Q: But if they are because the government is of the view they can be?

 

A: I don’t think so. I don’t know what will be the government’s view because from whatever we have known so far and whatever we have seen with our own experience with the IAEA, some of these things fall beyond the competence of the IAEA. But then we are seeking them from the IAEA.

 

Q: But if they are because the government is of the view they can be?

 

A: I do not think so, because I do not know what will be the government’s view. From whatever we have known so far, whatever we have seen with our own experience with the IAEA, some of these things fall beyond the competence of the IAEA, but we are seeking them from the IAEA.

 

Q: This is obviously a debatable point, because the government believes that the IAEA can deliver and will deliver. You are doubtful if the IAEA can deliver and are even more doubtful that it will deliver. So, leave this aside. The real issue that you have with the deal is that it facilitates a wider strategic relationship, that you do not approve of and it gives leeway to American hegemonic policies, that at all cost you want to resist. Therefore, the bottomline is no matter what the government does, in terms of the documents and assurances, that wider concern is going to continue. You are never going to be the one around to accepting this deal, no matter what paper or document you get?

 

A: Remove the condition of the Hyde Act and let the US do.

 

Q: But you know that cannot be done.

 

A: It is not our ideological predilection. It is an ideological predilection of the United States of America.

 

Q: Of course, the government has an answer to that, but you don’t accept it. The government says the Hyde Act does not affect the government, it only affects America. Secondly, the government says that once the 123 is through, it actually opened the door to the NSG and the NSG will then deliver a relationship independent of America. But you cannot deliver the NSG until you have the 123. You are not accepting any of that.

 

A: 123 is anchored in the Hyde Act and therefore, to say that the Hyde Act is only valid for United States of America, is not correct.

 

Q: I accept that. We now come back to an argument that you have had with many members of the press. In other words, despite the slight shifting of the veto, the Left position remains identical. The Left Opposition remains as adamant and you are convinced that you haven’t opened any window whatsoever. All you have done is tantalize people.

 

A: Not tantalize. The government asked for this opportunity to negotiate with the IAEA, to test and ensure whether the assurances given by the Prime Minister can be met.

 

Q: Is this what you mean when you say that you have given the government an honorable exit? You are saying all right, go to the IAEA, you will come back with the document we think you don’t like, but even if by some way you come back with a document that you like, we are still not allowing it, but you will allow it to go that much further and then you can honorably exit, rather than give the impression that you renege?

 

A: The word honorable exit is not ours. Let us say but in effect.

 

Q: Did you use it?

 

A: No, we did not use it, but it is being used. The government made its efforts. That is what the government wants to show the international community and we think that we are supporting the government. We do not want them to say that they have not been allowed to make that effort.       

 

Q: Did the government actually come to you and put it in these words, “let us appear to make a few efforts so that our international image is protected’?

 

A: No, they did not come to us.

 

Q: But it was inherent in their position?

 

A: To be fair again, the point was they came to us saying that let us go ahead to the IAEA. The change they made, which wasn’t there earlier was, will come back and show it to you. Once they gave us this assurance that they will come back and show it to us, before they initialize it. Then, we said okay.

 

Q: Once you come and show it to us, we haven’t lost our hold to stop it. Therefore, we have no problem with you going one-step further. Previously, when you weren’t going to show it to us, if we allowed it to go through, we would have lost the ability to stop you.

 

A: They would have gone all the way.

 

Q: You only permitted this because you have retained the ability to stop it?

 

A: Correct.  

 

Q: Let’s now look at the consequence that I believe are inherent in the positions that have been adopted. First there is the view that after the government has started talks with the IAEA and reached an outcome that atleast the government believes is acceptable in India’s interest. If at that point, you put pressure on the government to backoff, you have substantially raised the cost of backing out. Not only will the embarrassment for the government be greater but the international humiliation could be greater as well?

 

A: No, I don’t think so because the point at issue is that our opposition to this deal is now well known and the government is aware of it. It also knows the fact that there were assurances the Prime Minister himself gave to the Parliament, which have not been met. They are telling us, let us go ahead with the IAEA to ensure if that is done. But when they come back they say that these assurances are not being met, then where is the humiliation.

 

Q: But there is a problem because they will only come back to you after their negotiators have told the IAEA we think that we have a document that is acceptable. Now we are going back to our government for verification. At that point, if the government then turns around regardless whether it is under political compulsion from you or not and says, sorry boys we can’t accept what we have verbally agreed to, then the humiliation is greater?

 

A: That is only one option. There is another option, the negotiators can come back to the government and say this is as much as we can get, nothing further and then the government can say that we are not getting any further.

 

Q: But the government is convinced that the negotiators will succeed. You are the one who is doubtful; I am convinced that the negotiators will have the document that they can live with?

 

A: Let us see, I don’t think so.

 

Q: Let me quote to you a member of the UPA Left Committee speaking to the Indian Express on 17th November, the morning after the meeting that determined this new position. He says “Once we have completed formal negotiation with the IAEA, we cannot tell the IAEA that we will not sign it” then he says that “It will be a matter of national prestige”. You have raised the cost of backing off by giving them this leeway to go one step further?

 

A: I don’t think we have raised the cost. It is that particular person who said it, he is raising this.

 

Q: But that person is the government?

 

A: Yes, could be but they are raising it, we are not the one’s who are raising these stakes. They are raising it and they wanted to go. So we say go. But we say you cannot proceed further because what you have quoted to me also says that once we have agreed to an agreement; but that agreement will come when you put your initials on.

 

Q: You are being a bit technical on it.

 

A: So are you.

 

Q: But when you said that you, the Left, may not have raised the stakes. It is possible that the government in accepting the offer has raised the stakes itself?

 

A: No, I do not think either has because the point is that, what you are quoting is absolutely correct, if they have agreed with the IAEA then they come back here and then they renegotiate on that, then there is an embarrassment. But the point at issue here is that there is no agreement.

 

Q: It all depends upon the last words spoken by the negotiators in Vienna before they return to the government. The negotiators have to say to the IAEA “ We aren’t fully happy but we are going away with the best that we could get and we aren’t fully happy”. Problem is suppose the negotiators smile and say “thanks boys we have got a deal now, we have just want a confirmation from Delhi then there is a problem?

 

A: The fact is that they will say that we need confirmation from Delhi is in itself an admission of the fact that we have not got the entire thing that we want.

 

Q: Let’s leave that consequence for later on and there is the second consequence, which may be even a bigger consequence. Not only have you raised the level and embarrassment for the government if they back out. But paradoxically, you may have reduced the risks, the government runs of defying the Left. Previously if they have gone to the IAEA to start talks, when you were disapproving, there was a real possibility that the IAEA would have said the government coming no longer represents the Indian people and therefore no longer have the capacity to make commitments on their behalf.

 

Now when the government goes to start talks with the IAEA, they are doing so with your approval. Their bonafides are not in question. So the IAEA will happily negotiate with them. The risk would only come at the point when initialing happens and I put at you that not only is that a substantially reduced risk but there is every possibility that the IAEA wouldn’t balk at the initialing itself. You know and I know that the American government has specifically given an assurance to the Indian government that if you go thus far the IAEA will initial with you. So have you perhaps without realizing it reduced the risk the government runs of defying you?

 

A: Risk is a risk. There is nothing called the degree of risk. Because what were the options? That you had the deal and no government. You had the government and no deal or you had neither the government nor the deal. 

 

Q: That is the one that worried the current government that they may lose the government and not get the deal now because you have reduced the risk, they may lose the government but they could end up securing the deal. That’s why you made things easier.

 

A: But I firmly believe that the government’s interest is in securing themselves and not the deal. If they no longer are going to be in the government, what will they do with the deal?

 

Q: They may have decided that the deal is more important than fourteen months in office?

 

A: In which case, the government definitely needs to go if the deal is more important than being in government and from India’s point of view.

 

Q: India’s point is a question of who sees India’s point and who is interpreting, it is quite possible that supporters of the deal in the government may say at all cost we want the deal, even if the government goes. The nightmare was if the government went and the deal get it happened, your reducing the risk has made it possible for the government to secure the deal but sacrifice itself that is the change you have made possible.

 

A: The moment it sacrifices itself, it sacrifices a deal as well.

 

Q: Not necessarily once you are through with IAEA, it is an autopilot. America does the rest.

 

A: But you have to come back here for your cabinet approval. Where would there be a cabinet? By the time it goes through American Congress and comes back, you are in election mode, no government, no caretaker government is going to approve it.

 

Q: Once it goes through the US Congress and gets the final okay from US Congress, it is a done deal, the next government can sign it.

 

A: By the time all this happens this government here will be off. Elections will be there; maybe a new government will come.

 

Q: But the deal will be through.

 

A: The deal can be through even with the new government in India, if they want it.

 

Q: The difference is that if they had waited for the new government, the Bush government would have gone and in fact the capacity to pass it through the US Congress would have ended. Now the only thing is that you may have to wait for a new government to sign it but the deal would have passed Congress, passed NSG, passed IAEA, that is what you have made possible.

 

A: No way, the moment they come back here for the initialization, if at that point of time we say no, the moment they defy that, they betray this understanding. They have to betray this understanding, if they betray this understanding, they will have to pay the political price.

 

Q: Of withdraw of support.

 

A: Also the political price for betraying.

 

Q: They won’t fall immediately, there will be a ten-day period before the President-during that ten days they will have vote, during that ten days they will have initialed once they have initialed they are through the NSG. Once they through with the NSG the deal is through.

 

A: Politics cannot happen through the slate of hand. They have made a public commitment that at that point of time when at the time of before initialization they will come to the committee and they also reiterated that the committee is findings will be taken into the account before government proceeds.

 

Q: You have said that this might be an honourable exit for the government, I would put it to you that it could end up being an honourable exit for the Left behind the disguise of only permitting one stage, you may actually have permitted the whole thing to go through, the only hinge is, has the government got the guts to defy you?

 

A: It is not the question of guts. It is again the question of a political trust. They have given this trust not to us alone, to the people, to the country. They have said that we will come back here.

 

Q: Sounds like introducing morality into what was straightaway just a simple political equation?

 

A: There is political morality that is what politics all about.

 

Q: Politics is about grabbing an opportunity, the question is you have given one; will the government grab it?

 

A: No, I do not think they can.

 

 

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